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Appellate Practice and Procedure

by Roland F. L. Hall*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys noteworthy decisions addressing appellate
practice and procedure handed down by the Georgia appellate courts.'
The reviewed decisions fall into the following categories: (1) appellate
jurisdiction; (2) preserving the record; (3) notice of appeal; (4) timeliness
of appeal; and (5) miscellaneous cases of interest. Although there were
no dramatic developments during the survey period, the courts
addressed several topics of interest to the practitioner, particularly in
the areas of preserving issues for appeal and correctly drafting the notice
of appeal.
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Several cases during the survey period dealt with the sometimes
difficult determination of whether an order or judgment is "final" for
purposes of filing a direct appeal under section 5-6-34 of the Official
In Williams v. City of
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."). 2
Atlanta,' the administrator of plaintiff's estate moved to be substituted
as a party after plaintiff passed away. The trial court denied the motion
for substitution because of the administrator's failure to properly serve
all defendants with the motion. After plaintiff re-served all defendants,

* Partner in the firm of Autry, Horton & Cole, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994);
Senior Managing Editor (1993-1994). Member, State Bar of Georgia and the Florida Bar.
1. This Article primarily surveys cases decided during the survey period; however,
because no article on this subject area was published in last year's Georgia Survey, this
Article also surveys certain relevant decisions decided immediately before the survey
period.
2. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (1995).
3. 263 Ga. App. 113, 587 S.E.2d 261 (2003).
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plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the
trial court. On the basis of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-25(a)(1),4 which
provides for dismissal of an action against a deceased party if a proper
party is not substituted within 180 days of the filing of the suggestion
of death, plaintiff asserted in its notice of appeal that the trial court's
order was, in effect, a final order.' The court of appeals disagreed and
held that because dismissal was not automatic under the statute, and
the trial court did not dismiss the complaint, the trial court's order
denying substitution was not a final appealable order.6 The court of
appeals dismissed the administrator's appeal as premature.7
In Standridge v. Spillers,8 plaintiff brought a direct appeal from an
order denying his motion for default judgment and asserted that his
appeal was an appeal of a final judgment.' The court of appeals raised
the issue of jurisdiction on its own motion."0 As noted by the court of
appeals, the denial of a motion for default judgment was typically an
interlocutory ruling that was not directly appealable." In this case,
however, the trial court's order made findings of fact that barred the
relief requested by plaintiff and left no remaining issues to be resolved.
The trial court's order was effectively a final ruling on the merits of
plaintiff's action. 2 The court of appeals held that under the circumstances, the trial court's order was a final judgment, and accordingly, the
court of appeals had jurisdiction over plaintiff's direct appeal. 3
In Morton v. Fuller,4 plaintiffs brought an action against their
automobile insurer in plaintiffs' county of residence. After the case was
transfered to another county, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' action
without prejudice for failure to add a necessary party. Defendant
contended the dismissal was not an appealable final judgment, and, in
any event, plaintiffs should not be allowed to raise the issue of venue.'
The court of appeals disagreed and held that although the dismissal
without prejudice might allow plaintiffs to recommence the action at a
later time, the dismissal was still an appealable final judgment because

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

O.C.G.A § 9-11-25(a)(1) (1993).
Williams, 263 Ga. App. at 114, 587 S.E.2d at 261-62.
Id. at 114-15, 587 S.E.2d at 262.
Id.
263 Ga. App. 401, 587 S.E.2d 862 (2003).
Id. at 401, 403, 587 S.E.2d at 863-64.
Id. at 402, 587 S.E.2d at 864.
See Ware v. Handy Storage, 222 Ga. App. 339, 474 S.E.2d 240 (1996).
Standridge, 263 Ga. App. at 403, 587 S.E.2d at 864.
Id.
264 Ga. App. 799, 592 S.E.2d 460 (2003).
Id. at 799, 592 S.E.2d at 460.
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no other claims were pending. 6 In addition the court of appeals held
that the issue of venue was properly before it because whether the first
court erred in granting defendant's motion to transfer was related to
plaintiffs' appeal from the "final judgment."1 7 Concluding that the
transfer of the action was in error, the court of appeals reversed the
lower court's decision.' 8
When an appellant seeks review of claimed errors in multiple orders
of the trial court, but not all orders are directly appealable, the appellant
still has an opportunity to obtain direct review of all its claims of
error.'9 For example, in Schoenbaum Ltd. Co., LLC v. Lenox Pines,
LLC,20 plaintiffs contended that the court of appeals had jurisdiction

over only one of defendants' claims of error. That claim of error arose
from the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, an
order that was directly appealable under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-56(h).2
According to plaintiffs, defendants' other claims of error, including
claims arising from the trial court's denial of summary judgment to
defendants on other counts of plaintiffs' complaint, were not directly
appealable and were improperly "packaged" with the single appealable
claim. Thus, these claims could not be reviewed by the court of
appeals.22 The court of appeals, relying upon prior supreme court
precedent, held that when a direct appeal is taken, other rulings or
orders issued in the case that affect proceedings in the trial court may
be raised on appeal. 2' The court of appeals noted that the "rule is
designed to avoid 'appellate rule by installment,'"24 and held that
"[b]ecause the 'packaged' claims are sufficiently related to the directly
appealable claim and 'may affect the proceedings below,'" it would
review all of defendants' claims.25
The court of appeals further clarified the ability of non-parties to
appeal from orders or judgments affecting their rights.2 6 In BEA

16. Id. at 800, 592 S.E.2d at 461.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 801, 592 S.E.2d at 462.
19. Schoenbaum Ltd. Co., LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, 262 Ga. App. 457,459, 585 S.E.2d
643, 647 (2003) (citing Southeast Ceramics v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294, 271 S.E.2d 199 (1980)).
20. 262 Ga. App. 457, 585 S.E.2d 643 (2003).
21. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (1993).
22. Schoenbaum, 262 Ga. App. at 458-59, 585 S.E.2d at 647.
23. Id. at 459, 585 S.E.2d at 647 (citing Southeast Ceramics v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294, 271
S.E.2d 199 (1980)).
24. Id. (quoting Southeast Ceramics v. Klein, 246 Ga. 294, 295, 271 S.E.2d 199, 200
(1980)).
25. Id. (citations omitted).
26. BEA Systems, Inc. v. Webmethods, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 503, 595 S.E.2d 87 (2004).
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Systems, Inc. v. WebMethods, Inc.,27 plaintiff-appellee brought an action
under the Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 199028 against defendant, a
former employee of plaintiff, seeking injunctive relief that would prohibit
defendant from using plaintiff's trade secrets in defendant's employment
with plaintiff's competitor, a non-party. The trial court entered an
interlocutory injunction restraining the competitor without making a
finding that the competitor acted in concert with the employee, and the
competitor appealed.29
Although appellee argued that the competitor, as a non-party to the
action, lacked standing to appeal, the court of appeals held that because
the injunction directly affected the competitor, the competitor had
standing to appeal."0 The court of appeals based its holding on a series
of federal court decisions in which non-parties adversely affected by
injunctions were held to have standing to appeal.31 The court of
appeals noted that its conclusion directly followed from the court's prior
with standing to appeal when
holding that a non-party becomes a party
32
judgment is entered against that party.
III.

PRESERVING THE RECORD

The cases decided during the survey period, addressing preservation
of error, illustrate the importance of properly preserving issues for
appeal. Several of these cases, however, demonstrate that all hope is not
lost for appealing an issue, even when such an issue is not directly
raised in the trial court. For example, in Rouse v. MetropolitanAtlanta
Rapid Transit Authority,3 decided by the court of appeals sitting en
banc, plaintiff sued defendants Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority ("MARTA") and Millar (the elevator service company) for
negligence from injuries she received in a MARTA station when her foot
was caught in a gap at the bottom of the escalator. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants were negligent in allowing the escalator to be used when a
dangerous condition existed, and that MARTA failed to use reasonable
care in monitoring the escalator's condition. Defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that they had no prior knowledge of the
escalator's condition, and that no evidence showed negligence in

27. 265 Ga. App. 503, 595 S.E.2d 87 (2004).
28. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2000).
29. BEA Systems, 265 Ga. App. at 503, 595 S.E.2d at 88.
30. Id. at 508-09, 595 S.E.2d at 91.
31. Id., 595 S.E.2d at 92 (citations omitted).
32. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Segan, 190 Ga. App. 66, 67, 378 S.E.2d 367 (1989)).
33. 266 Ga. App. 619, 597 S.E.2d 650 (2004).
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maintaining the escalator. The trial court granted summary judgment
to defendants.'
On appeal the court of appeals noted that defendants were subject to
the standard of care applicable to common carriers and were thus
required to exercise extraordinary diligence to protect plaintiff from the
danger of injury." Plaintiff contended that evidence in the record
showed that defendants did not exercise extraordinary diligence because
defendants failed to install a comb plate switch that would have
36
automatically turned off the escalator and prevented her injury.
Defendants contended that because plaintiff failed to raise the "comb
plate switch" argument in the trial court, the argument could not be
considered by the court of appeals."
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that plaintiff, in response
to defendant's summary judgment motion, failed to argue that defendants had a duty to install the switch, the court of appeals nevertheless
The
held that plaintiff's argument could be considered on appeal.'
court of appeals held, with no citation to authority, that because plaintiff
raised the argument that defendants failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence, such argument included any issue of failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence raised by the evidence before the trial court.39
The court of appeals relied upon the deposition testimony of a former
employee of one of the defendants, who testified that such a safety
switch existed but had not been installed on all escalators in the MARTA
system.4" According to the court of appeals, such evidence in the record,
combined with plaintiff's general arguments concerning the standard of
care, was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.4 ' The court of
appeals further held that defendants' failure to install such a switch
presented a question of fact, and accordingly reversed the judgment of
the trial court.42
The dissent, comprised of four judges, noted that plaintiff did not
allege in her complaint, nor did she argue in response to summary
judgment, that defendants had any duty to add a safety feature, such as
the comb plate switch, to make the escalator safer than its original

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 619, 597 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 620, 597 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 622, 597 S.E.2d at 653-54.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 654.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 621, 597 S.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 622, 597 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 624, 597 S.E.2d at 654.
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design, and that the trial court had never ruled upon the issue.4" The
dissent argued that the claim was not properly raised below and quoted
prior authority for the proposition that the purpose behind summary
judgment "is thwarted when a party may withhold meritorious legal
arguments until appeal."' As noted by the dissent, if the rule did not
require that all legal issues first be asserted in the trial court, "a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment need not raise any legal issue,
spend the next year thinking up and researching additional issues for
the appellate court to address, and require the opposing party to address
those issues within the narrow time frame of appellate practice
[rules]. 45
In contrast to its decision in Rouse, the court of appeals in Designs
Unlimited, Inc. v. Rodriguez46 reaffirmed the court's traditional
reluctance to review arguments not raised before or reviewed by the trial
court.47 In Rodriguez the trial court determined that defendant was
not subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 9-10-91(1), 4 1 which provides for jurisdiction when a nonresident
transacts business within the state.49 On appeal, plaintiff argued that
the trial court erred when it failed to consider whether defendant could
be subject to jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(2),50 which
provides for jurisdiction when a nonresident commits tortious acts within
the state.51 The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument, holding
that because plaintiff failed to raise such an argument before the trial
court, and the trial court's ruling was limited to plaintiff's argument
under O.C.G.A. section 9-10-91(1), the court of appeals could not review
plaintiff's asserted enumeration of error.5 2 The court noted, as it had
on prior occasions, that the court would not apply "'a "wrong for any
reason" rule to reverse incorrect rulings on issues not raised or ruled
upon in the trial court.'"53

43. Id. at 627-28, 597 S.E.2d at 657-58 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 628, 597 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 275 Ga. 827,
828, 573 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2002)) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
46. 267 Ga. App. 847, 601 S.E.2d 381 (2004).
47. See Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829, 573 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2002).
48. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) (1982).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 9-10-91(2).
51. Id.
52. Designs Unlimited, 267 Ga. App. at 847, 601 S.E.2d at 381.
53. Id. at 847-48, 601 S.E.2d at 381 (quoting Lowery v. Atlanta Heart Assoc., 266 Ga.
App. 402, 405, 597 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2004)).
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The Georgia Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in McCombs v.
Synthes (U.S.A.), 54 a medical products liability case. To consider
whether the court of appeals erred when it held that plaintiff was
precluded from raising on appeal certain arguments concerning the
learned intermediary doctrine, 5 the supreme court granted certiorari.5 The court of appeals based its holding on plaintiff's failure to
specifically assert such arguments before the trial court.5 7
Under the learned intermediary doctrine, a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals or medical devices has a duty to warn the patient's doctor of
any dangers associated with its products.5" Asserting the learned
intermediary doctrine, defendants moved for summary judgment on
plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim because they contended defendant's
warning to plaintiff's doctor was sufficient to satisfy any duty to warn,
and they owed no duty to plaintiff. The trial court granted summary
judgment to defendants. 9
On appeal plaintiff argued that a jury question existed as to the
adequacy of the warning defendants gave to plaintiffs doctor; however,
in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff never
raised any argument that the warning to her doctor was inadequate.
The court of appeals declined to address plaintiff's contention because of
plaintiff's failure to raise such contention in the trial court.'
The
supreme court reversed the judgment, holding that the trial court, in
granting summary judgment to defendants, must have necessarily
concluded that the warning given by defendants to plaintiffs doctor was
adequate as a matter of law.6
The supreme court held that "the
adequacy of the warning was an issue raised by [defendant's] motion for
summary judgment, and was6 2an issue necessarily resolved adversely to
[plaintiff] by the trial court."
The decision in Torres v. Tandy Corp.' illustrates the care that must
be taken to properly preserve errors in jury instructions and verdict
forms for review. In Torres plaintiff brought a personal injury action
against defendants after she was struck while crossing a street by a

54. 277 Ga. 252, 587 S.E.2d 594 (2003).
55. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
56. McCombs, 277 Ga. at 252-53, 587 S.E.2d at 594.
57. Id. at 253, 587 S.E.2d at 594 (citing McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 250 Ga. App.
543, 546, 553 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2001)).
58. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 595.
59. Id. at 253-54, 587 S.E.2d at 595.
60. Id. at 254, 587 S.E.2d at 595.
61. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 595-96.
62. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 596.
63. 264 Ga. App. 686, 592 S.E.2d 111 (2003).
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vehicle driven by one of the defendant's employees. The jury found in
favor of defendants. On appeal plaintiff contended, in one of her
enumerations of error, that the first question on the special verdict form
The court of
given to the jury was ambiguous and misleading.'
appeals held that plaintiff waived this enumeration of error by failing to
properly and timely object at trial. 6s Although plaintiff objected at trial
to the verdict form on the basis of its length and apportionment of
damages, plaintiff never raised any objection to the first question on the
verdict form. Further, plaintiff failed to object to the form of the
question at the time the verdict was returned.'
Verification that all evidence relied upon is part of the record is, of
course, essential in building an appeal. In Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v.
Reddick,"7 plaintiff appealed from a grant of summary judgment to
defendants. Plaintiff moved the trial court to supplement the record to
include discovery materials that the parties relied upon in arguing
summary judgment but which were not filed with the trial court before
The court of appeals
the summary judgment motion was granted.'
held that because the trial court was required to base its decision on the
materials on file in the trial court, the court of appeals, in reviewing the
grant of summary judgment, could only consider evidence presented to
the trial court before that court's ruling.69 Accordingly, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to supplement the record.7"
In Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Cook,7 ' plaintiff Cook sued
defendant for, inter alia, wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract.
Defendant defaulted, and pursuant to ajury trial on damages for certain
claims of plaintiff, plaintiff was awarded $125,000. No trial transcript
was ordered or made. After judgment was entered, defendant moved for
a new trial on damages, which the trial court denied.
On appeal defendant contended that the jury verdict was excessive,
that the award of attorney fees was improper, and that the trial court
impermissibly allowed the addition of two individuals as parties to the
case. 73 The court of appeals held that because there was no trial

64. Id. at 686-87, 592 S.E.2d at 112, 114.
65. Id. at 690, 592 S.E.2d at 114.
66. Id.
67. 267 Ga. App. 68, 599 S.E.2d 20 (2004).
68. Id. at 69, 599 S.E.2d at 23.
69. Id. at 69-72, 599 S.E.2d at 23-25.
70. Id. at 72, 599 S.E.2d at 25.
71. 267 Ga. App. 368, 599 S.E.2d 319 (2004).
72. Id. at 368, 599 S.E.2d at 321.
73. Id. at 368-70, 599 S.E.2d at 321-22.
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transcript, and defendant "made no attempt to have the trial court make
a transcript or a reconstructed transcript of the proceedings approved by
the trial judge," the court was required to assume the judgment was
correct.7 4 The court of appeals determined that "[in the absence of a
trial transcript, there is nothing to review, and we can not determine if
the verdict is excessive .

.

Because the judgment did not indicate

whether attorney fees were awarded or what evidence was considered,
the absence of a trial transcript was also fatal to defendant's claimed
error as to the award of attorney fees. 6 The court also held that the
absence of the trial transcript made it impossible to review defendant's
contention concerning the addition of parties, once again noting that
defendant had not attempted to have a transcript made or reconstructed.77
Absence of the trial transcript also proved decisive in the case of
8 After a bench trial on plaintiff's action for trespass,
Martin v. Martin."
defendant was ordered to stop using plaintiff's land and to pay punitive
damages and attorney fees. On appeal defendant argued that the trial
court ignored his defense, and that the evidence showed he lacked the
requisite intent. In his brief defendant referenced facts contained in his
sworn answer but failed to provide a trial transcript. 79

The court of

appeals concluded that it had no choice but to assume the trial court had
considered defendant's defense and rejected that defense based on all the
evidence heard at trial.8 " The court of appeals reversed the award of
punitive damages, however, because it could determine from the record
that the award of punitive damages was improper.8 1
The absence of a complete record also prevented full review of
petitioner's arguments in the supreme court case of Strykr v. Long
County Board of Commissioners.2 Petitioner sought to have certain
amendments to a county ordinance permanently enjoined and stricken
as unconstitutional. Although petitioner's primary arguments concerned
the amendments, petitioner also raised constitutional arguments
challenging language in the original ordinance.' The supreme court
held that because only the amendments to the ordinance were placed in

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 369, 599 S.E.2d at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370, 599 S.E.2d at 322.
267 Ga. App. 596, 600 S.E.2d 682 (2004).
Id. at 597, 600 S.E.2d at 683.
Id.
Id. at 598, 600 S.E.2d at 683.
277 Ga. 624, 593 S.E.2d 348 (2004).
Id. at 624-26, 593 S.E.2d at 349.
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the record, the court could not address any arguments challenging the
original ordinance because it could not take judicial notice of a county
ordinance that had not been alleged or proved.84
IV.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

The required contents of the notice of appeal for both the supreme
court and the court of appeals are set forth in O.C.G.A. section 5-6-37,5
and include, inter alia, a concise statement of the judgment, ruling, or
order from which the appeal is taken.86 In preparing a notice of appeal,
the appellant must take care to fully describe each order of the trial
court that he or she intends to appeal, or otherwise risk waiving issues
on appeal. In Bowers v. Lee," plaintiffs, who had brought claims
against defendants for, inter alia, medical negligence, appealed from an
order granting summary judgment to defendants. In their notice of
appeal, plaintiffs stated that the motion appealed from was the order
granting summary judgment. On appeal plaintiffs contended that the
trial court should have granted their motion to enter a default judgment
against one of the defendants."8 Although plaintiffs argued the issue
of the propriety of the default judgment in their brief, the court of
appeals held that plaintiffs waived consideration of the issue on appeal
because their notice of appeal failed to reference the order denying the
motion for default judgment.89
In its analysis the court of appeals noted that the summary judgment
order, from which plaintiffs appealed, referenced a prior order dismissing
several of plaintiffs' claims, but did not reference the order denying the
motion for default judgment, which had been entered the same day as
the order granting dismissal.9 ° Presumably, if the summary judgment
order had referenced the order denying the motion for default judgment,
the court of appeals would have held this reference sufficient to meet the
"specification" requirement, and plaintiffs could have avoided waiver.91
Failure to properly specify all orders appealed from also spelled defeat
for the appellant in Miller v. Miller.92 In his appellate brief, appellant
argued that the trial'court erred in denying his motion for reconsidera-

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 626, 593 S.E.2d at 350.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37 (1995).
Id.
259 Ga. App. 382, 577 S.E.2d 9 (2003).
Id. at 384, 577 S.E.2d at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
262 Ga. App. 546, 586 S.E.2d 36 (2003).
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tion and his motion to amend the pre-trial order. Both orders were
related to the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendantiappellee.93 Because appellant sought review in his notice of
appeal only of the order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court of appeals held that appellant waived consideration
of any issues arising from any other orders of the trial court. s4
The appellant in Patel v. Burt Development Co.95 enjoyed better
fortune when appellee failed to prevail on his argument that appellant's
notice of appeal was deficient for failing to specifically identify the order
being appealed. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff/appellee on a breach of contract claim, and appellant, in his notice
of appeal, referred to a "final judgment on the question of liability."9 6
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 5-6-37, 97 contending that appellant's notice of appeal did not
sufficiently identify the order from which appeal was taken." The
court of appeals held that even when the notice of appeal fails to
specifically designate the order from which an appeal is being taken,
when the identity of the order is apparent from any or a combination of
the notice of appeal, the record, or the enumeration of errors, the appeal
will be considered.99 Because it was obvious from the record that
appellant was appealing from the order directing a verdict, the court of
appeals denied appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal. 10 0
O.C.G.A. section 5-6-37 also requires that the notice of appeal include
a designation of those portions of the record to be omitted from the
record on appeal.' 1 As demonstrated by Moulton v. Wood,1 2 care
should be taken when deciding to omit parts of the record. 10 3 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
appellee on the basis that appellant failed to include all material
evidence in the record on appeal.'O° Appellant, in her notice of appeal,
requested that the clerk include only the complaint, amended complaint,

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 550, 586 S.E.2d at 40.
Id. at 549-50, 586 S.E.2d at 40.
261 Ga. App. 436, 582 S.E.2d 495 (2003).
Id. at 438, 582 S.E.2d at 497.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37 (1995).
Patel, 261 Ga. App. at 438, 582 S.E.2d at 497.
Id.

100. Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-37.
265 Ga. App. 389, 593 S.E.2d 911 (2004).
Id. at 389, 593 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 389-90, 593 S.E.2d at 912.
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and filings after appellee's motion for summary judgment." 5 The court
noted that the notice of appeal was improper in form because appellant
listed those items to be included in the record rather than designating
portions of the record to be omitted on appeal.' 06 Accordingly, the
court of appeals held that because discovery responses, an affidavit, and
a deposition cited in the summary judgment documents were not in the
record, the court was required to presume that the superior court record
supported the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee. 10' The
court of appeals further noted that "appellants who omit portions of the
record which they view as not pertaining to any issue on appeal create
a probably fatal defect in their appeals."'~'
V. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL
At issue in Craig v. Holsey1°9 was whether a void motion for new
trial extended the time for filing a notice of appeal. After judgment was
entered against defendant, defendant filed a timely motion for new trial,
which was dismissed because of defendant's failure to perfect service of
his motion by obtaining and serving a rule nisi. Defendant filed his
notice of appeal within thirty days after dismissal of the motion for new
trial but more than thirty days after entry of judgment, and plaintiff
moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis of untimely filing of the notice
of appeal." 0
The court of appeals, after holding that the motion for new trial was
clearly void for failure to perfect service, noted that a motion for new
trial that is void because of untimely filing does not toll the time for
filing a notice of appeal."' However, when the motion for new trial is
timely filed but void on some other basis, such as failure to perfect
service, the motion for new trial does toll the time period for filing a
notice of appeal." 2 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 5-6-38(a),"' the
trial court's order dismissing the motion for new trial is considered an
order disposing of the motion." 4 The court of appeals concluded that
because the notice of appeal was timely, it could consider plaintiff's

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 389, 593 S.E.2d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 389-90, 593 S.E.2d at 912.
Id. at 389, 593 S.E.2d at 912.
264 Ga. App. 344, 590 S.E.2d 742 (2003).
Id. at 344-45, 590 S.E.2d at 744-45.
Id., 590 S.E.2d at 745.
Id. at 345, 590 S.E.2d at 745.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-38(a) (1995).
Craig,265 Ga. App. at 344, 590 S.E.2d at 745.
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appeal from the verdict and judgment and from the order dismissing
plaintiff's motion for new trial."5
In Willis v. City of Atlanta,"6 the trial court entered two interlocutory orders granting the defendant partial summary judgment on several
of the plaintiff's claims and ultimately granted summary judgment to
defendant on plaintiff's remaining claims. Plaintiff timely filed a notice
of appeal from the final order granting defendant summary judgment.
Defendant argued that because plaintiff failed to initiate separate
appeals for each of the interlocutory orders within thirty days after each
7
order's entry, plaintiff's appeal from those orders was untimely." The
court of appeals disagreed and held that under O.C.G.A. section 9-119
56(h)," 8 no separate appeal of the interlocutory orders is required."
The court of appeals further held that because the orders appealed from
granted partial summary judgment to the defendant, plaintiff's appeal
fell under the "exception to the finality rule,"'2 ° provided by O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-56(h), which allows a party, against whom summary
judgment was granted, to appeal either after the grant of summary
judgment or after the rendition of the final judgment.' 2 '
VI.
A.

MISCELLANEOUS

The "Two Term" Rule

In In re Amar Pal Singh,"2 the supreme court clarified that the "two
term" rule does not apply in every case.' 23 Under that rule, which is
established in the Georgia Constitution," 4 both the supreme court and
the court of appeals are required to "dispose of every case at the term for
which it is docketed on the court's docket for hearing or at the next
Petitioner Singh failed to achieve a passing score on the
term."
Georgia bar examination and appealed on the basis that the method of
computing scores violated the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice

115. Id. at 345, 590 S.E.2d at 745.
116. 265 Ga. App. 640, 595 S.E.2d 339 (2004).
117. Id. at 640, 595 S.E.2d at 341.
118. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(h) (1993).
119. Willis, 265 Ga. App. at 640-41, 595 S.E.2d at 341.
120. Id. (quoting Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 242 Ga. 242, 243, 248 S.E.2d 641,
642 (1978)).
121. Id.
122. 276 Ga. 288, 576 S.E.2d 899 (2003).
123. Id. at 290, 576 S.E.2d at 901.
124. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 2.
125. Id.
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of Law126 in Georgia. Singh argued that because the supreme court
did not dispose of his appeal during the term of court in which it was
filed or during the following term, he should be admitted to the practice
of law by default.'2 7 The supreme court held that the "two term" rule
applies to cases falling within the court's general and exclusive appellate
jurisdiction, but the rule does not apply to cases filed in furtherance of
the court's exercise of its inherent authority to regulate the practice of
law in Georgia."2 The supreme court noted that, in any case, the only
remedy for a court's failure to comply with the "two term"
rule is
129
affirmance of the lower court's judgment by operation of law.
B.

Court Rules
Although, on occasion, the appellate courts might overlook minor
errors of form, strict adherence to format requirements is the best and
safest policy. Failure to do so can, in extreme cases, lead to waiver of
arguments on appeal. In Vaughn v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty
Insurance Co.," the court of appeals chastised appellant for "citing to
the record sparingly in her statement of facts," failing to number the
pages in her brief, failing to state how each enumeration of error was
preserved for consideration, and failing to provide a concise statement
of the applicable standards of review.'3 ' The court of appeals also
noted that the sequence of argument in appellant's brief did not follow
the sequence of the enumerations of error."2 More seriously, because
the appellant failed to support with argument certain of her enumerations of error, the court deemed abandoned all issues reasonably
contained within such unsupported enumerations of error." Additionally, the court held that because the argument presented in support of
another enumeration of error merely restated the enumeration of error
and failed to cite authority, such enumeration of error, under Court of
Appeals Rule 27(c)(2)," 4 was deemed abandoned."'
Even when a party ensures that all evidence necessary to support its
appeal or defense of an appeal is in the record, properly citing such
evidence can prove essential. As the court of appeals has noted on
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

GA. R. Gov'G ADMIs. PRAc. LAw (2004).
Singh, 276 Ga. at 290, 576 S.E.2d at 901.
Id., 576 S.E.2d at 900-01.
Id. at 290 n.3, 576 S.E.2d at 901 n.3.
260 Ga. App. 573, 580 S.E.2d 323 (2003).
Id. at 574, 580 S.E.2d at 325.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 325-26.
Id.
GA. APP. R. 27(c)(2).
Vaughn, 260 Ga. App. at 574, 580 S.E.2d at 326.
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several occasions in the past few years, from the court's perspective,
"'[aippellate judges should not be expected to take pilgrimages into
records in search of error without the compass of citation and argu-

ment.' "136
In Bonner v. Brunson,"7 the court of appeals refused to sift through
a voluminous record in search of evidence cited by plaintiff in his
brief.'38 Plaintiff, a subcontractor, brought suit against defendants, an
LLC and its owner, to collect money allegedly owed for roofing work
plaintiff had performed. Plaintiff claimed that the individual defendant
was personally liable for the LLC's debt by virtue of disregarding the
corporate form. Plaintiff argued that six payments made by the LLC to
a separate corporation owned by the individual defendant constituted
139
Citing Court of Appeals
evidence of disregarding the corporate form.
to
consider the payments,
declined
Rule 27(c)(3),"'o the court of appeals
noting that:
In support of this contention, [plaintiff] argues only that there is an
absence of evidence showing what the payments were for and cites to
a 28-page list of checks in the record showing about a thousand checks
written by the LLC for various purposes on the project, apparently
hoping we will sift through all the checks to find and address the six
or more payments.141
In the absence of any evidence showing abuse of the corporate form, the
42
court of appeals affirmed the judgment.
C.

Mandamus

In Titelman v. Stedman,"4 appellant found herself in the unusual
situation of being unable to appeal from the court's order because of the
lack of a written order. After appellant lost custody of her children, she
attempted to file a petition for adjudication of deprivation with the
juvenile court. The juvenile court judge denied filing of the petition and
refused to sign any order documenting the denial of the filing. As a
result appellant could not appeal. Appellant then filed a petition for

136. Vick v. Tower Place, L.P., 268 Ga. App. 108, 109, 601 S.E.2d 348 (2004) (quoting
Rolleston v. Estate of Sims, 253 Ga. App. 182, 185, 558 S.E.2d 411 (2001)) (citation
omitted).
137. 262 Ga. App. 521, 585 S.E.2d 917 (2003).
138. Id. at 523, 585 S.E.2d at 919.
139. Id. at 521, 523, 585 S.E.2d at 918-19.
140. GA. APP. R. 27(cX3).
141. Bonner, 262 Ga. App. at 523, 585 S.E.2d at 919.
142. Id. at 523-24, 585 S.E.2d at 919.
143. 277 Ga. 460, 591 S.E.2d 774 (2003).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

mandamus seeking an order requiring the juvenile court judge to enter
a written order, but the petition was denied.' 44 On appeal the supreme court initially noted the well established principle that an oral
order is neither final nor appealable until reduced to writing, signed by
the judge, and filed with the clerk, because without a judgment in
writing, the appellate court has no question to decide.'" The supreme
court held that this principle applies whether a trial court issues an oral
ruling on the merits or orally denies the filing of a petition or other
pleading.'" The court concluded that trial courts "have a clear legal
duty to enter all of their judgments, including those which deny the
filing of an initial pleading." 147 The court held that mandamus was
appropriate to compel the juvenile court to enter a written order from
which an appeal could be taken.'"
D.

Verified Pleadings

Although not technically a case addressing appellate procedure, the
case of Keyser v. Allied Holdings, Inc." is of interest to any trial
attorney attempting to avoid creating issues that could derail a case on
appeal. In Keyser plaintiff filed a verified complaint for injunctive relief
and damages against defendant, a former employee, on the basis of
violation of an employment contract. The trial court granted summary
judgment to plaintiff on liability. Defendant appealed, contending the
complaint was not properly verified. 5 ° The court of appeals agreed
and held that plaintiffs statement that the facts were true to the best
of the knowledge and belief of plaintiff's corporate officer was "just a
variation of our old friend 'information and belief" and did not
demonstrate the personal knowledge necessary to verify the complaint
Because no other evidence in the
for summary judgment purposes.'
judgment to
record supported the trial court's grant of summary
5 2
plaintiff, the court of appeals reversed the judgment.
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Id. at 461-62, 591 S.E.2d at 775.
Id at 462, 591 S.E.2d at 775.
Id., 591 S.E.2d at 776.
266 Ga. App. 192, 596 S.E.2d 713 (2004).
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